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DOES FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE REST
ON A MISTAKE?: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
COMMENSURABILITY DEBATE
R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
Determining whether a person is actually doing what they sincerely
claim to be doing sometimes requires care in describing their activity.
Consider the case of a reader of tea leaves. Even the skeptic can concede
that the reader's purpose in examining the tea leaves is to ascertain the
future. In this sense, the reader is actually "reading" the tea leaves. But
in another sense the reader is laboring under what most of us take to be
an error of logic or of fact, albeit in good faith. Future events of personal
interest are only randomly related to the arrangement or pattern of se-
lected tea leaves. One therefore cannot read tea leaves by systematically
drawing connections between aspects of the tea leaves and significant fu-
ture occurrences. No such systematic connections exist, and none is
there to be "read."
What this Article shall refer to as the "commensurability' debate,"
a debate carried out with great vigor by a number of contemporary phi-
losophers,2 unfortunately arouses suspicion that judges, despite their
good faith and best efforts, are in a position roughly anaiogous to that of
the tea leaf readers when the judges apply common techniques for decid-
ing free speech cases. The judges' error is subtler and more excusable
than that of the tea leaf readers. While in one sense judges are doing
what they purport to be doing, a fair conclusion is that in another more
important sense they are not.
Typically, judges adjudicating free-speech cases purportedly engage
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; A.B.,
University of Virginia, 1972; Ph.D., Indiana University, 1976; J.D., Indiana University, 1982.
1. Commensurability refers to the comparability of two things on a single, standard mea-
surement scale. See Perry, Some Notes on Absolutism, Consequentialism, and Incommensura-
bility, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 967, 979 (1985).
2. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986); Griffin, Are There Incom-
mensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 39, 44 (1977); Hallett, The 'Incommensurability' of
Values, 28 HEYTHROP J. 373, 381 (1987); Perry, supra note 1, at 979; Regan, Authority and
Value: Reflections on Razs Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1056 (1989); Van
Bendegem, Incommensurability-An Algorithmic Approach, 32 PHILOSOPHICA 97 (1983).
764 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in some form of weighing or balancing of conflicting interests? This ad-
mittedly metaphorical technique is neither explicitly referred to in the
Constitution generally nor in the first amendment's Free Speech Clause
in particular.' Nevertheless, "the balancing of individual rights and pub-
lic good [has been maintained to be] the essence of American constitu-
tionalism."5 With increasing frequency, the Supreme Court of the
United States has adopted one form or another of balancing in free-
speech cases.6 This Article argues, however, that the Court cannot co-
herently balance state interests and the right of free speech, at least in
any way authorized by the Constitution. This means that most free-
speech balancing decisions are constitutionally illegitimate. However,
for several reasons explored below, an "absolutist" interpretation of the
Free Speech Clause is not the only remaining constitutional option for
deciding free-speech cases.'
II. BALANCING IN FREE SPEECH CASES
The logic supporting balancing in free speech cases was set forth in
Justice Felix Frankfurter's classic concurring opinion in Niemotko v.
Maryland.' Justice Frankfurter referred to "the inevitable conflict be-
tween free speech" 9 -which he conceived of as an interest'°-on the one
hand, and various other important interests" on the other. He applied
balancing in an attempt to reconcile the multiplicity of interests at
stake."a While the balancing process is often described as involving op-
posing "interests," courts and commentators have also referred to
3. See Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1022, 1022-23 (1978).
4. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment reads in pertinent part: "Con-
gress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... ." Id.
5. See Henkin, supra note 3, at 1041.
6. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 967
(1987).
7. "Absolutism" in this context refers simply to the idea that freedom of speech is inde-
feasible, or limitless in power within its scope. For background, see Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245 (1961).
8. 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 275 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 276 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (other important interests include protection of pub-
lic peace and of primary uses of streets and parks).
12. Id. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, after discussing a number
of free speech cases, id. at 276-81 (Frankfurter, J.,'concurring) proposed several factors to be
used to determine which was the "overbalancing consideration." Id. at 282 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). These factors were: "'(1) What is the [state] interest deemed to require the regu-
lation of speech? ... (2) What is the method used to achieve such ends as a consequence of
which public speech is constrained or barred?... (3) What mode of speech is regulated?... (4)
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"needs," 13 "harms,"14 "values," 15 or "rights," 16 perhaps assuming that
such concepts are essentially synonymous.17 Occasionally, courts do not
further classify free speech in any fashion, and instead presumes to sim-
ply weigh or measure "the 'invasion of free speech' "18 as one element in
the balancing process.19
Since then, the Supreme Court has developed a variety of balancing
tests. Some of these tests are suited for different types of speech, others
for restrictions on speech, still others for taking into account other rele-
vant contextual differences.20 In sum, and without placing too much
stock in the precise phrasing, the law is that content-based restrictions on
speech,21 or at least on political speech,22 must further a compelling state
interest, and be narrowly tailored to the interest served.23 Content-neu-
Where does the speaking which is regulated take place?" Id. at 282-83 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
13. See, e.g., Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 449, 461 (1988).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); see also R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191-92 (1977).
17. The Court apparently considered the concepts of interest, right, and need to be
equivalent in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987).
18. See, ag., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (adopting Chief Judge
Learned Hand's balancing formula used in majority decision of court below, "whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
19. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510; see also Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424, 1427-28 (1962). The Learned Hand free speech balancing formula is elabo-
rated on in Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1986), in which Judge Posner weighs the social losses and social costs associated with an
invasion of free speech. Id.
20. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
21. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989). A restriction is content-
based if "on its face a governmental action is targeted at ideas or information that government
seeks to suppress, or if a governmental action neutral on its face was motivated by (i.e., would
not have occurred but for) an intent to single out constitutionally protected speech for control
or penalty. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (2d ed. 1988) (footnotes
omitted).
22. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1019-20
(1989) (challenged law burdening political rights can survive only if state proves law advances
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)
(statute prohibiting signs which disparage foreign governments within 500 feet of embassy
deemed as unconstitutional, content-based restriction on political speech in public forum be-
cause not narrowly tailored).
23. See, e.g., San Francisco County Democratic CenL Comm., 109 S. Ct. at 1019-20; Sable
Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2836; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. "Narrowly tailored" governmental
regulations of free speech must generally be designed to avoid restricting speech that does not
interfere with the governmental interest. See Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
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tral time, place, and manner restrictions,24 even in a public forum," may
be justified if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information."26 At the same time, regulations of
activity involving a mixture of speech and conduct must, among other
requirements, further an important or substantial state interest. 27 Re-
strictions on commercial speech must also be narrowly tailored to the
governmental interest served and must directly and with some degree of
effectiveness promote a "substantial" governmental interest.28 Finally, in
the area of public-employee speech, the Court has held that the constitu-
tionality of discharging a public employee for speech depends upon "'a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.' "29
These formulae illustrate the balancing tests commonly employed
by the Court in typical free-speech cases. Each of these balancing tests
may be comprised of one or more subordinate balancing tests. Whether
an interest qualifies as "compelling," for example, may itself be a deter-
mination requiring some balancing.30 Even whether a particular regula-
tion is "narrowly tailored" to effect an interest may also inescapably
24. Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are governmental restrictions on
speech as to when, where and how it can be made, unrelated to the content or message of the
regulated speech. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989).
25. A "public forum" is a place, such as a street or public park, which is by tradition or
government fiat the site of public discussion and advocacy. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (refusing to classify teachers' workplace
mailboxes as public forum because unavailable for use by general public).
26. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Compare this requirement that government interests
be significant with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) which summarizes time, place and
manner restrictions as requiring that governmental interests be "important." The per curiam
opinion in Buckley also used the more purely evaluative, normative terms of a "sufficiently
important" interest. Id. at 25.
27. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (law prohibiting destruc-
tion of draft-cards upheld as furthering an important or substantial governmental interest);
Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 839 (1990) (challenge to municipal regulation of cable
broadcasting).
28. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3032 (1989) (regulation of kitchen-
ware demonstrations and sales in college dormitories); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (regulation banning electric utility from adver-
tising to promote use).
29. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (brackets in Rankin).
30, See infra text accompanying note 154.
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involve value balancing.3"
As the formulae suggest, the balancing process is often focused on
one or more of the "interests" that might be involved in a case, and par-
ticularly on those interests invoked by the government in supporting the
restriction on freedom of speech. Again, placing too much stock in the
Court's precise terminological choices is unwise; the cases lack uniform-
ity even under particular tests.32
More importantly, ambiguity continues as to whether the interest in
question is characterized in only minimally comparative terms, e.g., a
"substantial" interest, or in more clearly comparative, more directly nor-
mative terms, 33 e.g., an interest "sufficiently substantial" to justify an in-
cursion into the rights or interests of the speaker.34 This ambiguity
particularly haunts the notion of a "compelling" state interest. The
courts have simply never clarified whether a compelling interest is: (1) a
particular kind of interest, presumably of a high order, such as national
security; or (2) an essentially circumstantial and normative, more purely
comparative conception, encompassing by definition any jurispruden-
tially recognized state interest which is sufficiently strong as to justify an
impingement upon free-speech rights or interests.
35
Among state interests found to be compelling, or perhaps suffi-
ciently compelling under the circumstances in light of the costs to free-
dom of speech, are the interests in preserving the integrity of the election
process,36 maintaining the stability of a state's political system,37 protect-
ing the judicial system from undue political influence, 3 ensuring public
officers' faithful exercise of their official obligations, 39 and shielding mi-
nors from pornographic literature or telephone messages not obscene by
adult standards.'
However, in some cases in which the Supreme Court and lower
31. See, e.g., Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2839-40 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia recognized in Sable that the courts often intuitively trade off degrees of furthering the
restrictive statute's purpose against the degree of precision in narrowness of tailoring of the
restriction to the purpose. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring)
32. See infra notes 36-40 & 153-57 and accompanying text.
33. This Article uses the phrase "normative term" to describe a phrase such as "sufi-
ciently substantial" which implicitly suggests an outcome and, therefore, actually creates a rule
of law.
34. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
36. See San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. at 1024.
37. See id. at 1022.
38. See Geary v. Renne, 880 F.2d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 1989).
39. Id. at 1071.
40. See Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
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courts might have been expected to refer to "compelling" state interests,
the Court has instead referred to "important," "overriding," or "strong"
interests.41 For example, the national interest in fostering and maintain-
ing international relations has been referred to as "important,"42 and the
interest in preventing statements by law enforcement employees promot-
ing serious, violent crime has been referred to as "strong. '43 The equiva-
lence of "compelling" with "important" or "strong" state interests is
questionable and highlights the lack of clarity as to how evaluative and
comparative" is the concept of a "compelling state interest." The more
purely evaluative the concept of "compelling" becomes, the less informa-
tive and the less useful it becomes as a component of a balancing test.
Lesser interests, relevant in connection with presumably less de-
manding types of balancing tests, include interests of substantial impor-
tance,45 substantial interests,46 and significant interests.47 Courts have,
for example, identified community aesthetics as an interest of "substan-
tial importance."' '48 Privacy within one's home, prevention of crime, and
consumer protection have been recognized as among the range of sub-
stantial state interests. 9 In addition, the interest in promoting an educa-
tional, as opposed to commercial, atmosphere on college campuses,50 the
41. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986), a free exercise of religion case, in which Chief Justice Burger referred to the "impor-
tant" interest in preventing fraud in Social Security benefit programs. Id. at 709. Justice
O'Connor wrote in terms of the lack of "overriding weight" of the government interest in
administrative efficien6y, apparently treating interests of overriding weight as synonymous
with "compelling" interests. Id. at 730 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
42. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
43. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discharge of county employee for
remark expressing hope that next presidential assassination attempt is successful held to vio-
late employee's first amendment rights).
44. The problem may be stated as whether the term "compelling" state interest refers
merely to the result of the balancing process, or refers instead to a classification that is a part of
the actual balancing process itself.
45. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
48. See, eg., Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (government
interests in community aesthetics held to be substantial or important); Ackerley Communica-
tions v. City of Sommerville, 878 F.2d 513, 521 (1st Cir. 1989) (government interest in city
aesthetics held to be of substantial importance).
49. See, e.g., Project 80's, Inc. v. City of Pocatello, 876 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted and judgment vacated sub nor. Idaho Falls v. Project 80's Inc., 110 S. Ct. 709 (1989)
(government has substantial interest in consumer protection, protecting citizens' privacy and
prevention of crime).
50. Board of Trnstees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3032 (1989).
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interest in promoting safety,51 and in protecting citizens from unwanted
noise 2 have also been held to be substantial state interests. Among the
interests deemed to qualify as both important and substantial, in the con-
text of cable television programming, are the promotion of "localism,"
community pride, cultural diversity, and the provision of jobs and intern-
ships for residents of one locality rather than another.53 The free move-
ment of traffic on the public streets and associated traffic-safety interests
have qualified as "significant." 54 Despite the variety of terms employed,
it is difficult to believe that the courts have systematically adhered to any
scheme in which real differences between and among substantial, impor-
tant, and significant interests are recognized and observed.
Although the identification and categorization by the courts of these
undoubtedly overlapping interests leave a train of unresolved questions,
55
balancing in many free speech contexts may remain attractive, especially
to those who emphasize value pluralism and relativism. As Louis Hen-
kin has observed, "Balancing is highly appealing. It provides bridges be-
tween the abstractions of principle and the life of facts. It bespeaks
moderation and reasonableness, the Golden Mean. It refines the process
of judicial review. It softens the rigors of absolutes, makes room for
judgment and for sensitivity to differences of degree."' 56 Balancing in
freedom-of-speech cases is, however, constitutionally and logically
problematic.
III. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF VALUE COMMENSURABILITY
A. The Possibility of Commensurability
Each of the free speech balancing tests referred to above, however
formulated, logically requires a court to perform a comparison, however
intuitive, subjective or vaguely described that comparison may be, and
regardless of what is being compared. For example, when a government
employee is dismissed for allegedly speaking on an issue of public con-
cern, the court must compare the relative weights of the relevant inter-
ests, or at least some of the relevant interests, pulling the result in either
51. Id.
52. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2756.
53. Chicago Cable Communications, 879 F.2d at 1549-50.
54. E.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d
494, 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1989) (government has significant interest in regulating traffic flow and
promoting roadway safety).
55. The unresolved questions might include- questions such as: Are compelling interests
the same as "strong" interests? On what grounds does a court evaluate a legitimate statutory
interest to determine whether the interest is "strong," "weak" or in between?
56. Henkin, supra note 3, at 1047.
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direction.17 This kind of relative weighing necessarily involves at least
some minimal commensurability, or common ground for comparison, be-
tween or among the interests to be weighed.
In the course of discussing the issue of the commensurability of sci-
entific theories, Professor Van Bendegem, a philosopher of science, has
provided what he referred to as an algorithm of commensurability.5 8
Under this approach, commensurability requires that a person be able to
"(1) identify the things to be compared (2) decide on a set of criteria on
which the comparison will be based (3) execute the comparison [and] (4)
reduce [the criteria into] a single scale."59 Commensurability, and hence
any comparison requiring commensurability, collapses if any one of the
four stages fails.'
Van Bendegem's understanding of commensurability seems to paral-
lel that offered by Professor Michael Perry in his discussion of commen-
surability of values.6 ' Under Perry's approach, "two things are
commensurable if there is a standard of comparison-if the two things
can be put on the same scale, if they can be measured against, compared
to, one another in terms of the same standard."62 Alternatively, com-
mensurability may be thought of along the lines suggested by Professor
Donald Regan,63 who proposes that:
Two valuable things are incommensurable with respect to their
value if (a) neither is more valuable than the other, and (b) they
are not of equal value. If neither is more valuable than the
other, and if their values are also not equal, then clearly their
values are incomparable. They do not appear on any common
scale of orderingf
4
For this Article's purposes, any of these conceptions of the nature of
commensurability will suffice.
The problem then becomes one of determining whether the judicial
process is a legitimate mechanism for resolving apparently conflicting,
incompatible values in a free-speech context. Often, there cannot be both
maximum freedom of speech and maximum fulfillment of some signifi-
57. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). See also supra text accompanying
note 29.
58. Van Bendegem, supra note 2, at 97.
59. Id. at 98.
60. Id.
61. Perry, supra note 1, at 979.
62. Id.
63. Regan, supra note 2, at 1056.
64. Id. For a similar approach, see J. RAZ, supra note 2, at 332 (incommensurability as
flowing from being neither better, nor worse, nor of equal value).
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cant, substantial, important, or compelling state interest. The typical ju-
dicial resolution seems to involve comparative weighing of values in some
respect, but one must ask whether the values weighed are actually com-
mensurable in a constitutionally legitimate way.
For several reasons, the legitimacy of any theory of commensurabil-
ity could be questioned. Many instances of free-speech balancing seem
dauntingly difficult, as do many instances of value balancing in general.65
Weighing an intrusion on freedom of speech against the possible attain-
ment of some sort of incompatible public good can often lead to con-
clusory or arbitrary judicial decisions. 6 Examining a judicial opinion in
an attempt to determine why, precisely, one interest was held to out-
weigh another is often disappointing.67 Further, the correctness of the
outcome of free-speech-balancing cases cannot, any more than in the case
of value comparisons generally, 68 be proven. Professor Hallett has
framed the issue in a striking fashion: "Suppose someone questions
whether the beatific vision is better than a box of chocolates. What an-
swer can be given him? No value considerations one might cite in sup-
port of this judgment will seem any surer than the judgment that is
questioned.
69
Of course, a thing that is difficult to do is not in principle impossible.
Even if value balancing has no demonstrably correct outcome, that
would not place value balancing in any more jeopardy than mainstream
ethical theory in general.70 These objections to the claim that values are
somehow commensurable in the context of free-speech adjudication are
not necessarily fatal to the validity of free-speech adjudication.
Naturally, however, one would demand an answer to the question of
the nature of the common scale or common standard against which the
values, of whatever sort, on both sides of a free-speech case, are mea-
sured. The desired answer need not imply the ability to perform cardinal
measurements.71 Indeed, a defender of value commensurability need not
65. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 381. For an attempt by Professor Hallett to apply rudi-
mentary quantitative techniques to a complex practical instance of value balancing in the
realm of public affairs, see G. HALLETT, REASON AND RIGHT 185-86 (1984).
66. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (free speech interest of constable office employee in
wishing for assassination of President as outweighing interests of employer in office loyalty,
morale, and integrity).
68. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 383.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., J. MACKIE, ETHICS (1977) (ethical principles ultimately matter of subjective
choice or preference).
71. See Hallett, supra note 2, at 375.
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point to any particular system of measurement units, 72 or a scale in any
rigorous sense, as long as some method, however intuitive, of ascertain-
ing which side of the judicial balance is heavier, and which side is lighter,
can be described.
Any number of candidates for the commensurating unit may, in cer-
tain situations, suffice. Professor Perry is quite right, in a sense, when he
observes that "I cannot think of any two things that are not commensu-
rable-that cannot be compared in terms of the same standard. Think of
any two things ... and then consider this standard: which of the two
things you would prefer to talk about right now."' 73 Of course, this com-
mensuration may not differentially value the two things in any socially
interesting way, but preference for discussion is not the only method of
value commensuration available. A person, including a judge, might in-
stead choose between two incompatible alternatives on the basis of mere
general preference, or on the basis of one outcome's promising greater
overall satisfaction of desires, for either the chooser74 or for society as a
whole.
Professor Hallett has suggested that the common denominator or
single scale we are searching for is nothing other than the idea of "value"
itself.76 This view may do no more than once again raise the question of
whether there is greater and lesser value, simpliciter, as opposed to par-
ticular kinds of values which may themselves take on different qualities
and magnitudes. It may be impossible to maximize "value" overall in
some generic sense. 77 It may even be doubtful as to whether it is coher-
ent to aim at maximizing the less abstract quality of "overall satisfac-
tion." Whether one particular social choice can be said to maximize
overall societal satisfaction, or utility, is notoriously controversial.
78
However, incommensurability of values is plausible only up to a cer-
tain point. It is difficult to assert that there is no meaning to the question
of whether it is preferable under ordinary circumstances to not be dis-
tracted from one's recreational coffee drinking in order to rescue one's
72. Id.
73. Perry, supra note 1, at 980.
74. See Griffin, supra note 2, at 44.
75. See id. at 48.
76. Hallett, supra note 2, at 376.
77. For a brief summary of Professor Hallett's approach in this regard, see G. HALLETT,
CHRISTIAN MORAL REASONING: AN ANALYTIC GUIDE 71-72 (1983).
78. Mill's views on the possibility of the interpersonal comparison of utility are expressed
in his essays. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS (S. Gorovitz ed. 1971).
See also R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 261-65 (1979); Griffin, supra
note 2, at 50-51.
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friend from a painful accidental death." At least some intuitive sense
leads us to meaningtully assert or deny that person X is better at one
activity than another, or even that person X is better at activity A than
person Y is at activity B.0 Commensurability of values, in a constitu-
tional or other context, is not shown to be illegitimate, therefore, by
merely pointing out thaL judges in free speech cases are seeking to com-
pare "apples and oranges."'" An apple may be heavier, for example,
than an orange, or more immediately, preferred.
B. Limitations on Commensurability
Despite occasional broad assertions to the contrary,82 disparate val-
ues do seem commensurable in at least some sense. Saving a life does
seem to somehow outweigh undisturbed coffee drinking. Yet the claim
that values are or may be incommensurable has some validity. Experi-
ence seems to reflect instances in which neither of two opposing sides in a
legal case could be said to pose stronger arguments than the other, yet in
our minds the two sides are not closely balanced either.83 For example,
people commonly deny the value comparability of alternative career
paths, or of alternative types of recreation.84 A person may profess to
strongly prefer choice A to choice B, yet may be indifferent as between a
combination of choice A and choice C or a combination of choice B and
choice C.85
With respect to the use of pleasure or happiness as commensurating
standards, Professor Alasdair MacIntyre points out that the different
kinds of pleasures make different recreational choices more than just two
different paths to the same end.86 MacIntyre concludes that:
The happiness which belongs peculiarly to the way of life of the
cloister is not the same happiness as that which belongs pecu-
liarly to the military life. For different pleasures and different
happinesses are to a large degree incommensurable: there are
79. Pannier, Finnis and the Commensurability of Goods, 61 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 440,443
(1987).
80. See Brown, Incommensurability, 26 INQUIRY 3, 21 (1983).
81. Aleinikoff, supro note 6, at 972.
82. See, e.g., George, Human Flourishing as a Criterion of Morality: A Critique of Perry's
Naturalism, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1455, 1456 (1989) (introducing incommensurability-defense the-
ory of John Finnis); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1372 (1984) (re-
counting familiar critical assertion that interests cannot be balanced because it is impossible to
reduce them to some common measure of value).
83. See Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 9 (1977).
84. See J. RAz, supra note 2, at 336.
85. Id. at 328.
86. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 63-64 (2d ed. 1984).
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no scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them. Con-
sequently appeal to the criteria of pleasure will not tell me
whether to drink or swim and appeal to those [criteria] of hap-
piness cannot decide for me between the life of the monk and
that of a soldier.1
7
MacIntyre's point is well-taken whether in or out of a legal context.
The beginning of a proper reconciliation of proponents and opponents of
value commensurability may lie in this: in cases in which weighing or
balancing of values leads to an ultimately justifiable choice or result, such
a result is possible only because we subscribe to or have adopted other
more basic rules or principles which authorize or make legitimate the
particular weighing or balancing in which we engage. Thus, the value
choice of chocolate over vanilla is not irrational or otherwise illegitimate,
if one adopts an underlying norm that legitimizes choice on the basis of
sheer gustatory preference, in which the taste of chocolate and vanilla are
"weighed" by the chooser in this limited fashion. A predetermined ob-
jective, for example, may inform the value comparison."8 This sort of
predetermined objective is adopted independently of, and antecedent to,
the value weighing or balancing that it may or may not happen to legiti-
mize." Therefore, it has rightly been observed that given the "objective
of having an after-dinner drink, the act of drinking a cup of coffee is a
better choice than the act of being a true friend."9
Significant for our purposes, though, is that the more basic role or
principle that may authorize or perhaps drain the legitimacy from a par-
ticular sort of weighing or balancing may be not merely an ad hoc ante-
cedent personal choice, but a larger group tradition or convention.9" The
importance of this connection is to recognize that a society's basic com-
mitments, binding wherever applicable, may in part be expressed through
its law.92 A judge might want to weigh or balance the "interests"
thought to be most crucially at stake in the case. The judge might want
to commensurate those interests, or strike the balance in order to, for
example, further the public interest, maximize utility, minimize suffering,
or even maximally promote his or her own personal preferences. Judges
87. Id. at 64.
88. See J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHT 117 (1980).
89. See id. at 115.
90. Pannier, supra note 79, at 449.
91. See 3. FINNIS, supra note 88, at 117-18.
92. Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 58 (1978) (arguing that moral
judgments about right and wrong can be correct or mistaken).
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are, however, sworn to uphold the Constitution.93 It is entirely possible
that the Constitution, as a set of independent antecedent basic principles
and decision rules, may not authorize courts, at least in certain cases, to
commensurate the values at stake in the ways that may happen to be
preferred by the judge. In such cases, the court may in some limited
sense have commensurated values if it uses decision-making techniques
not authorized by the Constitution. But if the Constitution prohibits or
limits weighing or balancing in that kind of case, or fails to authorize the
judge's choice of the particular common scale or standard, then the
judge's commensuration of values is constitutionally illegitimate.
Constitutional provisions plainly differ as to the degree and nature
of any interest balancing they permit. The seventh amendment, for ex-
ample, provides for a right to a jury trial of common law suits involving a
sum in excess of twenty dollars.9" If the necessary prerequisites are met,
no general judicial balancing is authorized. There is no exception for
cases in which a jury trial would involve a waste of resources, or fail a
cost-benefit test, or disserve legitimate, significant, or substantial govern-
mental interests.9" In contrast, the eighth amendment prohibits excessive
bail or excessive fines.96 While in a limited sense this language is a flat
prohibition, more crucially, the very idea of "excessiveness" invites, and
in fact requires, some sort of inquiry in which opposing interests are
weighed and balanced, with the bail or fine as a result deemed excessive
or not.97 Balancing is also authorized and unavoidable in determining
whether the process accorded a private party by the government was the
process that was "due" under the fifth or fourteenth amendment. 98
In this respect, the Free Speech Clause is more like the seventh than
the eighth amendment, in that it flatly and unqualifiedly enjoins respect
for freedom of speech, however conceived, without reference to broad
interest balancing. 99 Subordination of free speech rights to general pub-
lic interests is a conceptually unsound judicial invention."°° Freedom of
speech, as a fundamental constitutional right, is by definition not suscep-
tible of being set aside merely on the basis of some marginally more at-
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49, 70-71 (1803) (Constitution directs "the
judges to take an oath to support it").
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
95. See id.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
97. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987) (explicitly balancing arres-
tee's and public's interests in pretrial detention context).
98. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explicitly balancing individual
claimant's and governmental interests at stake in disability benefit termination hearing).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend I. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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tractive incompatible ordinary public interest.'0° Neither the text of the
Free Speech Clause, nor its underlying logic, authorizes suppression of
free speech merely because it may be in the public interest, in some gen-
eral sense, to do so on a particular occasion.10
2
IV. COMMENSURATION OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
In areas of individual constitutional rights, whether in regard to
freedom of speech or other constitutional rights, the Supreme Court talks
in terms of balancing interests against interests10 3 at least as often as it
talks of balancing constitutional rights, as rights, against opposing inter-
ests." One possible explanation for this tendency is that speaking exclu-
sively in terms of opposing interests, rather than rights and interests,
seems, at least superficially, to reduce commensurability problems. For
example, a governmental or public interest might be weighed against a
private actor's "interest" with less controversy than it could be weighed
against a private actor's constitutional right, especially where the text of
the Constitution does not appear to authorize the regular, systematic bal-
ancing away of the right in question. Other, possibly deeper justifications
exist for the Court's frequent reference to "interests" in constitutional
balancing cases.' 0 5 But to evaluate those possible justifications, the na-
ture of interests, the nature of rights, and the murky relationship between
the two must be briefly explored.
To understand the nature of interests 10 6 one must recognize that the
concept of an interest, in the sense of what it may be in a person's interest
101. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). For an example of an ex-
plicit balancing of interests in a constitutional context more conducive to balancing, that of the
unavoidable inquiry into the reasonableness of the search or seizure under the fourth amend-
ment, see Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985) (" 'We must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' ") (quoting United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Although the Garner Court balanced in "[tihe suspect's
fundamental interest in his own life," id. at 9, it offered no indication of what a "fundamental
interest," as opposed to a fundamental right, was, nor did it grant any special constitutional
status to interests qualifying as "fundamental."
104. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (ruling that first amendment rights are
"preferred" over property rights).
105. The terminology of "interests," as opposed to "rights," would seem to maximize judi-
cial flexibility, and any judicial preference for moral relativism is presumably better served by
an "interests," as opposed to a "rights," vocabulary.
106. For a sensible, extended treatment of the concept of interests, see V. HELD, THE PuB-
LIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS (1970).
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to do, has at least some normative or evaluative content. Not everything
we may want or prefer is actually in our interest. 107 For example, people
may have an interest in retaining their own good health even if they fail
to recognize this interest or fail to promote their own good health.'0 8
One writer has denied that interests in and of themselves have pre-
scriptive force.' 0 9 Another writer has argued more specifically the obser-
vation that "nothing compels one to say that 'A ought to do X' is part of
the meaning of, 'X is in A's interests.' "11o In contrast, another writer
has concluded that the concept of interest does have prescriptive force."1
This dispute begins to illuminate the relationship between rights and in-
terests. Suppose that person B is trying to convince person A to do X.
Telling A that doing X would be in A's own interest has potential co-
gency. Whether we call this prescriptive force or merely acknowledge it
as providing a reason for A to do X is not crucial. The potential cogency
vanishes, though, when we substitute the concept of having a right for
the concept of having an interest. Pointing out that A has a moral or
legal right to do X does not normally amount to a reason for A to do X.
A's knowing of a right to do X may legitimize A doing X, but it does not
normally begin to suggest why A should exercise that right. For exam-
ple, that .4 has a right to evict C does not by itself suggest that A should
evict C. That A has an interest to evict C at least gives A some initial
reason to do so.
A person's interests, therefore, seem to lead to particular, determi-
nate choices by that person more clearly than do that person's rights.
This difference may be related to another difference between rights and
interests. Statements of what is in A's interest to do can be complete and
coherent without any essential reference to other people." 2 Consider the
case of an isolated individual on a desert island. It can be in Robinson
Crusoe's interest in survival 13 to stay out of the rain. In contrast, state-
ments of what a person has a moral or legal right to do seem to function
roughly to put up a barrier against interference by other people with that
person or with that person's actions. Statements of what A has a right to
do tell us primarily about what one or more persons other than A are
allowed to do. Thus, there is no cogency to the assertion that a person
107. See M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 20 (1988).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Frey, Interests and Animal Rights, 27 PHIL. Q. 254, 255 (1977).
111. McCloskey, Rights, 15 PHIL. Q. 115, 126 (1965).
112. See Frey, supra note 110, at 258.
113. See M. PERRY, supra note 107.
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should do X because that person has a right to do X.1 4
While interests seem to have more inherent motivating cogency than
rights, the concept of rights seems more directly relevant to what we
ordinarily expect judges to do, that is, to raise or lower barriers to action
between persons. A person or a society may be motivated to do X be-
cause it is in that person's or society's interests to do so. At the same
time, however, close to the essence of constitutional law is the duty of
judges to restrain, in proper cases, the pursuit of individual or collective
interests by means of barriers such as constitutional rights." 5
Rights have been conceived of in various ways.116 Some of the most
important rights in the constitutional context have a character Professor
Joel Feinberg refers to as "discretionary."' 17 This term refers to the bi-
valent or multivalent character of the right in question.118 The constitu-
tional right to speak, for example, actually amounts to a right to speak or
not to speak, as one prefers.' 19 The legitimate exercise of the right of free
speech may, as a discretionary right, take the form of not speaking, or of
performing what is in a sense "no action at all."' 20 In this respect, rights
obviously differ from interests. If doing something is in a person's inter-
est, and not merely within the scope of the person's rights, then ordina-
rily it will not be in that person's interest to fail to do the thing in
question. For example, if it is in a person's interest to have a balanced
diet, it is presumably not in that person's interest to have an unbalanced
diet or to fail to eat at all.
This difference between rights and interests is related to the fact that
"we may have rights to do what it is not in our interest to do."'' In fact,
114. Having a right to do X usually implies a concomitant right to not do X. Part of the
right to vote, or to speak, for example, is the right to abstain, or to hold one's silence. When
we tell a person that he or she has a right to speak, we are really telling him or her that he or
she has a right to speak or not speak. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943). That one may act in a
certain determinate way, or not, does not by itself provide much incentive to actually act in
that way.
115. The suggestion is not that only constitutional rights can restrain the pursuit of inter-
ests; a person may have a duty or obligation to not pursue her interests beyond a certain point.
The concept of having a right is a much more recent historical development than that of
having a duty. See A. WHITE, RIGHTS 21 (1984).
116. See generally J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ch. 5 (1973) (providing typology of
moral and legal rights); A. WHrrE, supra note 115, at 13-19 (providing typology of moral and
legal rights); McCloskey, supra note 111, at 119-20 (focusing on types of moral rights).
117. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 116, at 69-70.
118. Id.
119. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
120. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 116, at 70 (emphasis omitted).
121. V. HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS 20 (1984).
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a person may have a right to do something that is in no one's interest. A
person may have a legal right to bequeath a carton of cigarettes. As
another example, a foolish racial slur may simultaneously be protected
under current law122 and yet be a net disservice to the interests of all
directly affected parties. Conversely, one may have a genuine interest in
doing, or in being able to do, many things that are beyond the scope of
one's rights. Rights by their very nature are entitlements, 123 whereas in-
terests are not.
Noting these basic differences between rights and interests makes it
implausible to conclude that, for constitutional purposes, rights are
equivalent124 to interests, "on a par"12 with interests, or that "there is
no warrant for different categorical treatment of rights [and] inter-
ests." '26 Taking rights seriously, in the sense of not holding rights con-
tinually hostage to ordinary interest calculations, requires recognizing
the differences between the concepts of rights and of interests. 127
While undoubtedly some relationship exists between rights and in-
terests, the relationship is unclear in certain respects. Possibly, only per-
sons who have interests can have any kind of rights.128 Perhaps "rights
and interests share a common source" in the Constitution 129 and are
found in our nature as rational, sentient, or created beings. A quite plau-
sible if ultimately misleading argument has been that rights issue from
the interests of the right-holder. 130
At least some rights may be recognized only because of certain ante-
cedent purposes, or interests, that society wishes to fulfill. 13 ' Rights may
122. See, eg., Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 346 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 499 A.2d 648, 649
(1985) (store employee not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for using racial
epithet in dispute with customer).
123. See McCloskey, supra note 111, at 118. See also the controversial discussion of rights
in R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-60 (1974).
124. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term In
Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REv. 917, 920 (1988).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 969.
127. See I. SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 273-74 (1986)
(discussing historical relation between rights and interests in Anglo-American liberal tradition
of political theory).
128. See Regan, Frey on Interests and Animal Rights, 27 PHIL. Q. 335, 335 (1977) (assum-
ing, rather than arguing, that only persons with interests have moral rights).
129. See Gottlieb, supra note 124, at 974.
130. See J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 60
(1986). This argument is somewhat misleading because a right-holder's interest can only show
that the right-holder would benefit from having rights but the benefit does not, on its own,
create any right.
131. See A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 48 (1978).
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typically function to protect interests. 132 It may even be reasonable to
turn to a vague balancing of interests when we must adjudicate or choose
between inherently conflicting rights which enjoy the same status.'
33
Premises such as these may suggest that the actions of government, 134 or
the Constitution itself,t35 should be evaluated in terms of interest satis-
faction. While this conclusion is in a sense unobjectionable, it will lead to
dangerous results if it suggests that interests and rights of every kind are
commensurate.
Professor Joseph Raz implicitly warns of this danger when he as-
serts that "[g]iven that rights are based on people's interests it cannot be
claimed that [rights] are trumps in the sense of overriding other consider-
ations based on individual interests."' 36 But the statement that if A
arises from B, or has a source in common with B, it can rise no higher in
status than B is a fallacy. Consider, for example, the issue of whether a
person should be held in slavery or not. For the sake of argument, con-
cede that moral or legal rules against slavery are somehow based on indi-
vidual interests or on the public interest. However, focusing merely on
the slaves' best interests or some collective interest is not the most logi-
cally or conceptually powerful argument available against slavery. For
example, to stake the entire case against slavery in terms of some aggre-
gation of interests would be peculiar. Independent reference to the con-
cept of a right not to be a slave seems not merely to rephrase the
argument, but to add something to its cogency.
Despite the fact that rights may be based on or share a source with
interests, rights should not be reduced to and equated with interests. The
example of slavery suggests that the right to not be enslaved may not be
overridden by pointing to any mere combination of interests, including
those of the slave. One might loosely express this by saying that the right
not to be enslaved always "outweighs" whatever interests may be arrayed
in favor of enslavement. A better approach would be to say that the right
to not be enslaved, by virtue of being a strong, fundamental or even abso-
lute right, cannot be outweighed by placing it on a common scale with a
set of ordinary interests; in other words, the right and the interests are
not commensurable. 137 No common scale can legitimately, in a morally
132. J. RAZ, supra note 2, at 178-79.
133. J. FEINBERG, supra note 116, at 72-73.
134. See V. HELD, supra note 121, at 149.
135. See I. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 278-79.
136. J. RAZ, supra note 2, at 187.
137. This absolutist formulation will serve for most practical purposes, but conceivably
there may be some morally catastrophic set of circumstances in which, for example, the tempo-
rary enslavement of a truly randomly selected, ultimately compensated person under agreeable
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authorized way, 13 commensurate the right to not be enslaved against a
set of conflicting interests, such that the "balance" perhaps tips one way
and then the other.
No matter what the particular situation involves, the conclusion as
to the non-existence of a common scale rests partly upon the nature of
rights in general, and partly upon the character of the particular right in
question. Frequently, rights are "introduced to guard, legally or mor-
ally, the corresponding freedom." 139 Presumably, the point of character-
izing freedom of speech as a right is to distinctively protect freedom of
speech. For example, characterizing the freedom to criticize public offi-
cials as a fundamental' 4 "right"41 disallows broad interest-balancing. 4 2
Protecting freedom of speech by means of assigning it the status of a
right supposedly will, over the run of judicial decisions, be in the interests
of most or all persons. But giving freedom of speech the status of a fun-
damental constitutional right means either that we distrust our ability to
efficiently evaluate the relevant interests in particular free-speech cases,
or that freedom of speech, as a right, should not be subject to restriction
in particular cases even when the restriction could be seen as being in the
public interest. As a general rule, "rights take priority over interests,
even general interests," 141 or the interests of the community as a
whole. 44
Professor Ronald Dworkin makes this point in the following terms:
Suppose, for example, some man says he recognizes the right of
free speech, but adds that free speech must yield whenever its
exercise would inconvenience the public. He means, I take it,
that he recognizes the pervasive goal of collective welfare, and
conditions might be thought morally justified. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the corresponding "extreme" cases in the constitutional context of freedom
of speech.
138. Any person, including a judge, might "commensurate" the two conflicting alternatives
in the slavery case-slavery versus abolition-by asking, for example, which state of affairs
would be popularly preferred, but a safe assumption is that this commensurating technique is
not authorized by the Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 92-102. The point of
constitutionalizing any alternative is, at a minimum, to give it a special and a supra-
majoritarian status. See Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in 20 NoMos:
CONSTITUTIONALISM 189, 194-95 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
139. A. WHITE, supra note 115, at 144.
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (citing Madison, The
Report on The Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 575 (1876)).
142. See V. HELD, supra note 121, at 192; Mackie, vupra note 83, at 7-8.
143. V. HELD, supra note 121, at 192.
144 See Mackie, supra note 83, at 7-8.
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only such distribution of liberty of speech as that collective goal
recommends in particular circumstances. His political position
is exhausted by the collective goal; the putative right adds noth-
ing and there is no point in recognizing it as a right at all. 145
Thus, at a minimum, a right must generally defeat countervailing consid-
erations of public inconvenience. Now, a defender of the free-speech bal-
ancing tests146 can correctly point out that those tests may take free-
speech rights seriously in the sense of disallowing restrictions on free
speech and tolerating a mild degree of public inconvenience. 147 This as-
sumption, however comforting, is contingent and uncertain. What pre-
vents a court from reasonably concluding that the public convenience
rises to the level of a significant, or substantial interest? The balancing
tests leave free speech rights too insecure.
The illegitimacy of most free speech balancing tests is particularly
clear when one considers that freedom of speech is not merely any right,
but a constitutional right of the highest status. 148 The "preferred posi-
tion" of freedom of speech, as reflective of freedom of mind or con-
science, is uncontested.149 Just as infringement of the right to not be
enslaved would not be allowed based on a contrary substantial public
interest, the fundamental constitutional right of freedom of speech
should generally not be held hostage to countervailing public interests.
A spirit of accommodation suggests, though, that perhaps free
speech rights should be considered commensurable with, and
subordinated to, a "compelling" state interest, at least in a case when the
compelling state interest is greatly furthered by regulation on speech, and
where the state interest could not be furthered if the speech regulation
were at all less severe, that is, where the state regulation is the least bur-
densome alternative. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never pro-
vided a coherent definition for the phrase "compelling state interest." 150
145. R. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 92. See also J. FEINBERG, supra note 116, at 79-83.
146. See supra notes 8-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of free-speech balancing
tests.
147. Arguably, avoiding modest amounts of public inconvenience may not rise to the level
of a significant, substantial, or compelling public interest. See, e.g., Sable Communications v.
FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (although government has compelling interest in protecting mi-
nors, total ban on indecent dial-a-porn service'is overbroad); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (total ban on promotional advertising by
electric utilities overbroad even though state has substantial interest in energy conservation).
148. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 275.
149. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 n.35 (1985) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 164 (1944)) (preferred position of constitutional rights reflecting freedom of thought
and conscience).
150. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1026
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Several examples exist of what the Court has considered to be compelling
state interests, formulated in epically broad, general terms. 15  Repeated
use of the term "compelling," though, fails to show that the Court uses
the term unequivocally and coherently. 52
To their credit, Justices Blackmun and Stevens have separately writ-
ten of their doubts about the meaning of compelling state interests. 153
Justice Stevens has written that if "compelling" means "so important
that it overrides, on a constitutionally authorized common scale of val-
ues, the incompatible speech rights otherwise worthy of respect," then,
he concluded, the compelling state interest test is not a test but rather an
arbitrary pronouncement.1 54 Some evidence exists that the term "com-
pelling" is in fact used in just this utterly conclusory, question-begging
way.1
55
Justice Stevens has offered two slightly divergent accounts of what
"compelling" might mean in this context. A compelling interest might
be one such that a statutory intent to foster that interest automatically
constitutionalizes the statute.' 56 This interpretation does not solve the
obvious problem of whether any constitutionally legitimate interest can
be commensurated with and perhaps override the free-speech right. On
the other hand, Justice Stevens has concluded that if a compelling state
interest merely calls for "thoughtful attention" to the relationship be-
tween the statute and the asserted interest, then virtually any legitimate
state interest would qualify as "compelling," assuming that any and all
commensurability problems are set aside.'57
The problem of commensurating state interests and free-speech
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
152. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
153. See San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. at 1026 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. at 1026 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens noted that if "compelling" means "'convincingly controlling,' or
'incapable of being overcome' upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely
announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all." Id. (quoting Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. at 188 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
155. Note the judicial inclination to view "compelling" and "overriding" as essentially sy-
nonymous. See Galloway, supra note 13, at 465-66 (citations omitted). In the equal protection
context, Justice O'Connor has suggested that the Court considers whether the legislative goal
is "important enough to warrant" recourse to racial classifications. See City of Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989). This approach would also render "compelling" an
essentially conclusory pronouncement.
156. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 402 n.3 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
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rights in a way authorized by the Constitution has not been solved, and
the appropriate solution will reject anything remotely similar to the cur-
rent free-speech balancing tests. At first glance, though, if free-speech
rights cannot legitimately be commensurated with state interests under
the Constitution, the only alternative may be a controversial free-speech
absolutism, perhaps of a sort associated with Justice Hugo Black. 58
More thorough examination, however, shows that absolutism is not
the sole legitimate approach to free-speech law. As a matter of logic or
practicality, to deny the commensurability on a constitutionally author-
ized common scale of state interests and free-speech rights is not a com-
mitment to free-speech absolutism. Rather, a view of free-speech law
rejecting familiar sorts of absolutism159 as well as the common assump-
tion of the commensurability of interests and free-speech rights 6 ° is
warranted.
V. FREE SPEECH AS A NON-ABSOLUTE RIGHT
NOT LEGITIMATELY SUBJECT TO BALANCING
Several factors make possible a free-speech right which is neither
commensurable nor absolute. These factors include the nature of the
Constitution, the text and purposes of the Free Speech Clause,'61 and the
possibility of conflicts between free-speech rights themselves as well as
with other enumerated constitutional rights. Under such a formulation,
the limitations on the right of freedom of speech would arise not from
any general interest balancing of a familiar sort, but from the limitations
of the Constitution itself, from the idea of freedom of speech, and from
the Free Speech Clause's role within the Constitufion. These limitations
provide four approaches under which a court may find that a restriction
of speech is legitimate.
First, even a preferred or fundamental right, like freedom of
158. Justice Black felt that the free speech clause itself embodied whatever balancing the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution thought appropriate, and that literalism and absolu-
tism should generally guide free-speech jurisprudence. For a more detailed statement of Jus-
tice Black's position, see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960). See also
Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428
(1967); Meiklejohn, supra note 7, at 245. For early inquiries into the relative merits of absolu-
tism and balancing, see Frantz, supra note 19, at 1424; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
159. See, e.g., Black, supra note 158, at 874.
160. See supra notes 3-54 and accompanying text.
161. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878-86 (1963).
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speech,162 need not be absolute, in the sense of being limitless in scope or
indefeasible under all circumstances. 163  There are several reasons for
this. Under the Constitution, even the most austere and apparently ex-
ceptionless constitutional injunctions may not be controlling, or may be
temporarily set aside in extreme instances.1 64 The Constitution itself
may have certain aims and presuppositions. Certain ends may have been
in view in enacting and subscribing to, or otherwise recognizing the doc-
ument. At a minimum, parties may not want to construe the Constitu-
tion, or the Free Speech Clause, so as to create a "suicide pact."' 165 One
might reasonably argue that "internal" to the first amendment is an im-
plied exception for situations of immediate or otherwise inevitable socie-
tal destruction, 166 or more generally, some catastrophic moral horror, 167
that limit the scope of the right of freedom of speech.168 The focus is not
on weighing or balancing, but on an implicit exception that surfaces dur-
ing extreme circumstances.' 69 Limiting freedom of speech in this man-
ner, guided by this internal exception, 170 would be an extremely narrow
limitation on free speech as a right, rather than an interest to be balanced
away.
Second, freedom of speech may be less than absolute, even without
162. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (free public discussion
viewed as fundamental principle of American government).
163. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 116, at 80 (absolute as unlimited in scope); R. DWORKIN,
supra note 16, at 92 (absolute as not defeasible).
164. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964) (Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, but is not suicide pact); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963) (fifth and sixth amendment rights not preserved for members of armed
forces accused of crime); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-08 (1951) (discussion of
permissible government responses to organized subversive conspiracies).
165. Forjudicial statements of the understandable disinclination to view the Constitution as
a suicide pact, see, e.g., Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Buckley, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom.
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); United States v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 653 (7th Cir.
1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting in part) (citing Address by Chief Justice Burger, American Bar
Ass'n Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 8, 1981)).
166. See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1000.
167. See J. THOMSON, supra note 130, at 56.
168. Emerson, supra note 161, at 931-37. This exception might be sufficiently narrow on its
own terms to preclude regular judicial abuse, but it might be restated in more usefully concrete
terms. For example, this exception may apply in cases in which the survival of the nation itself
is jeopardized, or thousands of deaths are otherwise unavoidable, in the absence of the
restriction.
169. Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1000 & n.317. One should not too readily assume that
rights are absolute; rarely, if ever, will we be posed with a stark choice between societal preser-
vation and the violation of a right. But cf Frantz, supra note 19, at 1437 (assuming that right
against self-incrimination cannot be set aside even for societal preservation).
170. See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 1000.
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generalized interest balancing, if only government action which works a
genuinely meaningful restriction on the freedom of speech of the com-
plaining party is viewed as an abridgment of freedom of speech. 17 I This
approach is viable despite assertions that "one is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that
it may be exercised in some other place."' 7 2 Some restrictions on the
location of permitted speaking, for example, are simply insignificant from
the speaker's own standpoint in light of the legitimate free-speech-related
aims and purposes of the speaker.' 73 Furthermore, some restrictions on
the speech of a particular speaker are in practice only nominal. The re-
strictions may leave the speaker with alternative places to speak or ways
of speaking, without significantly distorting the speaker's message, reduc-
ing the size or quality of the audience, or otherwise significantly impair-
ing the overall value of the exercise of the right to speak. 174 Being asked
by the government to move one's sidewalk literature table away from a
fire hydrant may be best thought of not as a cognizable but justified bur-
den on free-speech rights based on a mysterious hybrid rights-utility
calculus, but as not abridging free-speech rights in any meaningful man-
ner, given the circumstances.
175
Third, even in the absence of general balancing, free-speech rights
are not absolute because not only will one person's exercise of free-speech
rights inevitably come into conflict with the free-speech rights of other
persons, 176 but also because such exercise will eventually come into con-
flict with other equally preferred and fundamental constitutional
171. This idea is similar to what is used in analysis of other fundamental rights, such as
privacy or travel, where the right only protects against governmental action that "impinges
upon" or "unduly burdens" that right. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977)
(New York law requiring recording of persons' names and addresses who had received pre-
scriptions of certain drugs did not "pose sufficiently grievous threat" to right to privacy to
establish constitutional violation); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256
(1974) (although state's requirement "impinges to some extent on the right to travel," requ-re-
ment was not unconstitutional).
172. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (restiction on speech in a labor context).
173. Cf. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 654-55
(1981) (recognizing that restrictions on fairgrounds solicitation left open other opportunities,
both inside and outside fairgrounds). In particular contexts, soliciting outside a fairgrounds
may allow the speaker to promote the speaker's own free-speech purposes or values as well, on
balance, as soliciting on the fairgrounds.
174. For elaboration of the underrecognized importance of alternative speech channel anal-
ysis, see Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance
of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 (1989).
175. Id. at 83-84.
176. For example, the right of a passenger on a city bus to address the other passengers
might conflict with the right of those passengers to engage in discussions of public issues
among themselves.
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rights. 17 7 In some cases, the courts may have literally no choice but to
sacrifice certain rights, because conflicting rights appear on both sides of
the case.1 78 The courts may in fact have no coherent guide to resolving
such conflicts. They may resort to a vague intuitionism in resolving such
cases. But in such cases, with fundamental constitutional rights inevita-
bly in conflict, no alternative may exist to using vague intuitionism.
Finally, free-speech rights are not absolute in the sense that not
every activity need qualify as speech in the constitutional sense. In the
area of free-speech law, the obvious purposes or values underlying the
Free Speech Clause cannot be ignored in order to find all sorts of activi-
ties to be "speech." 179 Perhaps the clearest case of expanding the con-
cept of speech beyond the limits suggested by the purposes of freedom of
speech was the Supreme Court's determination that ordinary barroom
commercial nude dancing fell into the category of speech in the constitu-
tional sense.180 If ordinary commercial nude dancing is to count as
speech, it is hardly surprising that the courts have often been inclined to
balance away free speech rights in favor of all sorts of legitimate public
interests. 81 Unjustified expansion of what counts as speech only makes
unjustified balancing of free speech rights seem that much more
attractive.
For example, courts may not justify violation of constitutional rights
by balancing away what they assume to be genuine rights of political
speech against loss of efficiency in a governmental office.1 82 If courts are
to restrict government-employee speech, they must either adopt one of
the four approaches discussed immediately above, or create some special
177. See Lehman v. Village of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (restriction on
speech on public bus permissible partly due to "captive audience" problem).
178. For example, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, free-press rights conflicted with the
right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial. 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). The Court observed in
Nebraska Press that "the guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition
under all circumstances .... ." Id. Not all conflicts between constitutional rights stretch the
limits of constitutionally principled adjudication, however. Certain constitutional rights, such
as the eighth amendment repudiation of "excessive" bail, or the due process requirements of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments by their very formulation invite the courts to consider a
range of values and costs in deciding the case. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
179. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
180. See id. at 66. The purposes, values or interests thought to underlie the Free Speech
Clause may include the search for trutb, political participation, and self-realization, among
others. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 161, at 879. For further discussion of the purposes or
values underlying the Free Speech Clause as imposing certain limitations on what can reason-
ably count as speech, see R.G. WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW (to be published
by Greenwood-Praeger 1990).
181. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 142 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
182. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
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doctrine, such as a theory that a government employee contractually
waives the right to speak publicly on office-related matters. Mere interest
balancing will not suffice.
VI. CONCLUSION
A fair conclusion is that free-speech rights are not absolute, and that
most of the current judicial balancing tests used to restrict freedom of
speech1 83 are either incoherent or not authorized by the Constitution.
Constitutional balancing tests generally attempt to commensurate di-
verse interests.1 84 Even if this were otherwise possible in a constitution-
ally authorized way, this process fails to take adequate account of the
significance of a constitutional right, as opposed to a mere interest, how-
ever important the interest may seem. Commensurating the right of free-
dom of speech with opposing state interests in a manner respectful of the
nature of the rights at issue is generally impossible. Fortunately, remain-
ing options are not restricted to an "absolutist" theory of free speech
rights, under which free-speech rights are taken as indefeasible, non-.
transferable, or limitless.
The objection might be raised that the concept of "interest" can be
used as a common scale to measure the relative worth of both rights :nd
interests that conflict in a given case. A judge might, for example, cor-
rectly arrive first at the "weight" of the interests that are in conflict with
the constitutional right. The judge might then attempt to consider the
extent to which the interests of the public, or of the right-holder, would
be advanced in various ways if the right-holder were allowed to exercise
the constitutional right at issue. But this approach would again reflect a
misunderstanding of the nature of a right. Rights are not forfeited
merely by imprudent use on a given occasion. Free speech rights are
very special rights indeed.'8 5 As we have recognized, though, if an activ-
ity does not implicate the interests we seek to protect through free-speech
rights, as in the case of ordinary commercial nude dancing,"8 6 we may
not be dealing with constitutionally protected speech at all. However,
once an activity is determined to be an exercise of a constitutional right
or, more specifically, as an exercise of free-speech rights, it cannot lose its
character as a right merely because its exercise on a particular occasion
183. See supra notes 8-54 and accompanying text.
184. See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 945, 973. For a recognition of the limits of sophisti-
cated cost-benefit balancing of all sorts c_ public interests, see E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 160-61 (3d ed. 1982).
185. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964).
186. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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might, all things considered, be thought to be contrary to the public
interest. 187
Generalized balancing in free speech cases has been thought to offer
increased rationality in adjudication.' It is fair to conclude, however,
that this objective has not been achieved. 18 9 Instead, as Professor
MacIntyre has suggested, the "facts of incommensurability"' 9' condemn
attempts to treat asserted rights and conflicting interests evenhandedly,
as on a common scale authorized by the Constitution, to failure.' 9'
If an activity is said to involve the exercise of the constitutional right
to free speech, it should be limited in only four situations. First, the
constitutional right can legitimately be limited in cases of looming moral
catastrophe. 192 Second, the right can be limited where it is not meaning-
fully impaired. 93 Third, the right can be limited where it necessarily
conflicts with equally inviolable rights.' 94 Finally, a claim to a constitu-
tional right can be rejected where the activity at issue does not fall within
the scope of the right, as determined by the constitutional text, the pur-
poses or values underlying the right, or other legitimate means of consti-
tutional interpretation.'95 These four limitations on the freedom of
speech would concurrently allow restoration of freedom of speech to its
proper status as a fundamental constitutional right without its becoming
an absolute right.
A right such as freedom of speech, by definition, cannot generally be
balanced against an ordinary interest. Free speech balancing tests are
ultimately incoherent or, at best not justified by the Constitution nor the
role of free speech within the Constitution. Free speech balancing tests
should, therefore, be abandoned.
187. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
188. See Mendelson, supra note 158, at 825.
189. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text
190. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 86, at 71.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying lext.
195. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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